Q2 GDP and June PCE

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

On July 25 the BEA announced that the advance estimate of real GDP increased 2.8% in Q2 on an annualized basis. The gains were fairly widespread, except for residential and non-residential structures, that fell 1.4% and 3.3%, respectively. Personal consumption expenditures, PCE, increased 2.3% and was the largest contributor to overall growth, at 1.57 percentage points.

PCE price index

On July 26, the BEA announced that the personal consumption expenditures, PCE, price index increased 0.95% on an annualized basis. Our preferred trend measure came in at 1.9%.

The Fed’s preferred measure, the PCE ex food and energy came in at 2.2% on an annualized basis while our trend measure came in at 2.6% and has continued to fall for the last 5 months.

As we have mentioned many times before, we believe our trend measure better captures the path of inflation and, more importantly, implications for Fed policy. For example, the annualized monthly change was higher in June, 2.2%, than in May, 1.5%. It seems pretty obvious that the Fed will not change its current stance on policy given this one month blip.

Policy Discussion

No doubt, there will be a lot of chatter about whether the FOMC should lower the Fed funds rate at its July 30-31 meeting, or wait until September. Or something else. To wade through all this, it helps to have a framework to organize thoughts about the incoming data. Arguably, the so-called Taylor rule has the broadest acceptance in the economics-policy profession. Briefly, the Taylor rule says that the Federal funds rate should be set as: (a) the natural real interest rate plus (b) the target inflation rate (2%) with (c) an upward adjustment when actual inflation exceeds target and (d) a downward adjustment reflecting slack on the real side of the economy. Typically, this slack is measured by either the output gap, or the unemployment rate gap. It’s easiest to understand why one of these gaps is included in the Taylor rule by thinking about what happens when there’s a negative gap. In the case of the unemployment rate, the idea is the demand for labor is high. Consequently, either firms will have to offer higher wages, or workers have more bargaining power and can command higher wages. Either way, these nominal wage channels put upward pressure on prices through some sort of “cost push” channel. This could be as simple as firms pricing using a constant markup over their (marginal) costs. In the case of a negative output gap, the story is that demand is outstripping supply, and firms find it easier to raise their prices. Returning to the Taylor rule, the idea is that these gaps reflect future inflationary pressures, and that the FOMC should respond now to head off future inflation.

There’s a lot of wiggle room in the Taylor rule. First, one needs an estimate of the natural real interest rate. The Atlanta Fed’s Taylor rule calculator provides eight (8!) choices for the real interest rate, currently ranging from 0.7% to 2.5%. That said, a given measure of the real interest rate does not change much over time.

Second, how to think about the deviation of inflation from target? As mentioned above, we like our trend measure which has moved down in 2024. The Taylor rule would, then, prescribe a lower Fed funds rate. But that prescription depends on the FOMC having religiously followed the Taylor rule over the past few years — which it almost certainly hasn’t. Nonetheless, some commentators may suggest that it’s time to start lowing the Fed funds rate since PCE inflation has come down in 2024.

Third, how to measure real-side slack? The output gap is given by potential output less actual output. The problem here is the nebulous concept of “potential” output. The fact that FRED has a potential GDP series is of no comfort. (“Fake data!”) To be absolutely clear, the output gap is a made-up number. Similarly, the unemployment rate gap is the difference between the “natural unemployment rate” and the actual unemployment rate. Some may substitute NAIRU (the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) for natural unemployment rate, but it’s the same basic idea. As with the output gap, there’s the problem of measuring the natural unemployment rate. (“More fake data!”) Between the output gap and the unemployment rate gap, the Atlanta Fed provides 18 (yes, 18!) measures of real-side slack. What’s does the Taylor rule say should be happening with the Fed funds rate based on recent real-side data? Currently, estimates of the output gap are positive: there’s slack in the economy which tends to push down the Taylor rule’s prescription for the Fed funds rate. The strong growth in the second quarter is likely to cut the size of this gap (unless of course, potential output is revised!) which calls for a higher Fed funds rate. On the other hand, the unemployment rate has increased, and so the unemployment rate gap has increased which, through the Taylor rule, would call for a lower Fed funds rate.

TLDR: Inflation is coming down; the Taylor rule dictates a lower Fed funds rate. The output gap has narrowed; raise the Fed funds rate. The unemployment gap increased; lower the Fed funds rate.

So, here is the rub, even with the most widely used model at hand, it offers little guidance as to what to do next. Indeed, there is way too much wiggle room to come to a coherent and consistent policy recommendation.

June CPI

The June CPI numbers point to lower inflation. On an annualized month-over-month basis, CPI inflation fell from 0.07% to -0.67%; core CPI inflation dropped from 1.97% to 0.78%. The year-over-year measures recorded more modest declines, from 3.25% to 2.98% for CPI and 3.41% to 3.28% for core CPI. As we have emphasized in past posts, the monthly inflation rate is quite volatile while the annual inflation rate is slow to reflect changes in trend. For June, our measure of trend CPI inflation plunged by 1.1 percentage point to 1.58% while trend core CPI inflation fell 0.8 percentage point to 2.46%

Policy Implications

In about two weeks, the PCE deflator for June will be released. If our trend core PCE inflation falls by the same 0.8 percentage points that core CPI inflation fell, then trend core PCE inflation will sit at 1.8% – comfortably below the Fed’s 2% target. Alternatively, CPI inflation tends to run about 0.5 percentage points higher than PCE inflation. On this basis, one might expect our trend core PCE inflation for June to come in at 2.1% – just outside the Fed’s 2% target. Chairman Powell’s testimony earlier this week raised expectations of a rate cut this year, although the chairman was silent regarding the timing. Given the declines of the recent numbers, it appears that the Fed has pretty much achieved its longer run inflation goal. The real side of the economy seems to have been mostly unaffected by the rapid increases in the fed funds rate. The FOMC next meets July 30-31. As this stage, the question is: will the FOMC lower its policy rate at the end of July, or wait until September? The debate will probably hinge on what are the potential costs of cutting rates in July, if any? Stay tuned.

June employment

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

The BLS announced that employment in June rose 206,000, about 1/3 of that came from government employment. Downward revisions to the earlier months totaled 111,000.

The service sector saw a 117,000 increase with the health care and social assistance sector increasing 82,400; however the largest decline in the service sector came from temporary help services, falling 48,900 and has been in decline for a over the past year and a half or so.

Average hours of work remained steady at 34.3 and with the 136,000 private sector increase in employment meant only a small increase in total hours of work.

The household survey shows a 116,000 increase in employment. 277,000 more people entered the labor force and the number of unemployed persons increased 162,000. These changes led to an increase in the unemployment rate from 3.96% to 4.05%.

Policy Chatter

The labor market continues to run strong, despite the recent mediocre showing although the unemployment has risen slightly to 4.05%. Inflation has trended down and, depending on the particular measure, is not a great cause for concern. Some are calling for an interest rate cut my the Fed. Indeed, Mark Zandi, Chief Economist at Moody’s, has said that the Fed should lower interest rates since the Fed “has hit their objective.” If they have hit their objective of full employment and low inflation, does it seem reasonable to be lowering, or raising rates, at this time. He does continue by saying that maybe the equilibrium interest rate for the economy could be higher, but he says it is not 5.5%. Obviously this is an issue that the Fed will be dealing with in the near future.

May Inflation Report

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

Today’s PCE report was largely foreshadowed by the CPI report two weeks ago. Our measure of trend core PCE inflation fell 0.8 percentage points, from 3.42% to 2.61%, compared to the 0.7 point fall in the corresponding CPI inflation rate. The year-over-year core PCE inflation rate fell a more modest 0.2 percentage points to 2.57%. Meanwhile, the month-over-month rate fell a whopping 2.15 points (compared to 1.6 points for CPI) to 1.0%.

The overall (non-core) PCE inflation rate fell to -0.1% on a month-over-month basis; our trend measure fell 1.2 points to 2.25%; and the year-over-year rate dropped a more modest 0.1 points to 2.56%. These changes are roughly in line with the earlier May CPI inflation numbers.

Policy Outlook

As we have earlier pointed out, our trend measures of inflation see through the volatile monthly inflation rate changes while at the same time responding rapidly to changes in the underlying inflation trend — unlike the annual inflation measures. While the monthly inflation rate for May is a welcome development, it is but a single report for a series known for its volatility; the FOMC is unlikely to respond to a single positive report. On the other hand, assuming that monthly inflation rates continue to come in near the FOMC’s 2% target, it will take many months for the annual inflation rate to similarly reflect this 2% rate. While our trend measure of PCE inflation has moved towards the 2% target, it isn’t there yet. Between now and the FOMC’s July 30-31 meeting is a single CPI report, and a PCE report on July 30. Unless the real side of the economy softens, we do not anticipate a rate cut at the end of July.

The FOMC meeting September 17-18 will have PCE inflation measures for July and August, as well as a CPI release on September 11. Given that CPI changes are typically subsequently realized in the PCE, there may be sufficient positive inflation developments by the September meeting to warrant a cut to the Fed funds rate. The only fly in the ointment is that the Fed takes pains to avoid the perception that it is in any way meddling in U.S. elections, and so may feel constrained to wait until after the presidential election.

May CPI

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

The CPI was unchanged in May according to the BLS release. By any one of the measures, year over year, 3.25%, monthly annualized, 0.69% or our trend measure, 2.70%, CPI inflation is down. The core CPI (ex food and energy) shows a similar pattern.

Food away from home, used cars and trucks and shelter were items with the largest monthly price increases, 0.4%, 0.6% and 0.4%, respectively. The largest declines came from energy commodities, declining 3.6% and a 3.5% decline for the gasoline component.

What to Expect for PCE inflation

As we have discussed in earlier posts, year-over-year inflation measures evolve sluggishly. The reason for this sluggishness is that the year-over-year inflation rate is the 12-month average of month-over-month inflation rates. So, the change in the year-over-year CPI inflation rate equals the month-over-month inflation rate for the current month (the inflation rate being added to the calculation) less the month-over-month inflation rate from 13 months ago (the inflation rate being dropped from the calculation) — all divided by 12. As a result, even if the month-over-month inflation rates started coming in at, say, 2%, it would take nearly 12 months until the year-over-year inflation rate would reflect this new 2% trend.

Instead, consider our trend inflation measure which places a 1/3 weight on the current month-over-month inflation rate, and a 2/3 weight on last month’s trend inflation. Our trend measure of inflation will, necessarily, respond in a more timely fashion to month-over-month inflation rates. Our trend measure of CPI inflation fell by 0.66 percentage points; core inflation by 1.3 percentage points. Similar declines in PCE inflation would result in PCE inflation around 2%, and core PCE inflation around 2.67%. Alternatively, over long periods of time, CPI inflation runs approximately 0.5 percentage points higher than PCE inflation. Subtracting 0.5 percentage points from the May CPI inflation rates suggests PCE inflation of 2.2% for May, and core PCE inflation of 2.8%.

In other words, we expect good news on the PCE inflation front when the data for May is released in a couple of weeks’ time. That said, FOMC members have indicated that they will hold off on rate cuts until they have seen a few months of such positive developments, meaning inflation as measured by the core PCE deflator trending towards 2%. It remains to be seen whether FOMC members will feel pressure to cut rates given that the European Central Bank and the Bank of Canada have already cut their rates.

The FOMC statement came out on the same day as the CPI report and reiterated their earlier view

The Committee does not expect it will be appropriate to reduce the target range until it has gained greater confidence that inflation is moving sustainably toward 2 percent.

FOMC, June 12

And so they left the target rate unchanged at 5.25-5.5%. The general statement from the FOMC is that the real economy is still humming along, inflation is not yet revealing the hoped for sustainable decline.

May Employment Report

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

The BLS reported 272 thousand new jobs according to its Establishment Survey, easily beating economists’ expectations of 190 thousand reported by Bloomberg. The job gains for May exceed the average for the previous 12 months, 232 thousand. Job gains for March were revised down 5 thousand while those for April were revised down 10 thousand.

In contrast, the Household Survey indicates that the economy lost 408 thousand jobs in May. Indeed, 5 out of the last 8 months have seen the two surveys going in opposite directions.

The BLS also reported that the unemployment rate rose slightly, from 3.86% to 3.96% in May.

Meanwhile, the labor force participation rate dropped slightly, from 62.7% to 62.5%.

Average hours of work remained at 34.3 and private employment rose 229 thousand, leading to a 2.1% increase in total hours of work. Average hourly earnings climbed $0.14 and continue to lie above year over year inflation, thereby increasing real wages.

While the headline employment numbers come from the establishment survey, the labor force participation rate is calculated from a household survey, and is calculated by the number of people unemployed plus the number of people employed relative to the age 16 and over non-institutional population. Since the labor force participation rate fell, it follows that the sum of employed and unemployed people must have fallen. We also know that the number of people unemployed rose from 6.5 million to 6.65 million. Consequently, for the sum of employed and unemployed people to fall, it must be that the number of people employed fell. And that’s exactly what the Household Survey tells us. But not the Establishment Survey.

Overall, the labor market shows continued strength and will make the Fed’s decision a little more difficult. Inflation is still above the 2.0% target and with the strong economy there seems little reason to lower the rate at the next meeting. However, as we discussed above, reading the labor market is not as easy as first appears.

Inflation and GDP

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

The BEA has released PCE (personal consumption expenditure) price data for April. By all measures we look at, this measure of inflation is down. While the annualized monthly core PCE inflation rate dropped from 4.08% to 3.03%, our measure of trend only fell by 0.17 percentage points, from 3.53% to 3.35%. The reduction in our trend core PCE inflation is in line with that reported earlier for the April trend core CPI inflation rate (a drop of 0.2 percentage points). While the year-over-year core PCE inflation rate continues to fall, and run below these other measures of inflation, we anticipate that the year-over-year rate will start rising as the favorable monthly inflation rates in mid-2023 fall out of the calculation of the annual inflation rate.

The picture is largely similar for overall PCE inflation: a large drop for the month-over-month rate and more modest declines for the year-over-year and our trend measures.

The rapid increase in the Fed Funds rate from mid 2022 to mid 2023 and the decline in inflation now has the Fed Funds rate higher than the inflation rate and, more often than not, tends to keep inflation at bay. Note that after the Great Recession the inflation rate was above the Fed Funds rate longer than at any time since the 1960’s.

Earlier, the BEA released its second estimate of GDP for the first quarter of 2024. Output growth for that quarter was revised down slightly from 1.6% to 1.3%.

In the perverse world of monetary policy, slowing GDP growth is considered good news in the sense that so-called inflationary pressures are thought to be easing. Nonetheless (core) PCE inflation is still running above the Fed’s 2% target. Interest rate cuts appear to be some time off in the future.

April CPI

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

The consumer price index (CPI) rose 3.82% over the month on an annualized basis. While the increase was less than the previous month’s 4.65%, there is still some work to do according to the most recent FOMC announcement:

The Committee does not expect it will be appropriate to reduce the target range until it has gained greater confidence that inflation is moving sustainably toward 2 percent.

May 1 FOMC statement

According to our trend measure the CPI fell only slightly, from 4.11% in March to 4.02% in April. The core measure saw a steeper decline, from 4.39% in March to 3.56% in April. Our trend measure of core inflation fell to 3.97% in April compared to 4.17% in March.

All of these measures attempt to remove the highly volatile price movements. Indeed, there is another measure, dubbed Supercore, that contains only services with shelter prices removed. Our trend measure was 2% a year ago but has now climbed to 6.12%

As we have discussed before, the value of looking at CPI inflation is that it gives a hint as to what to expect from the PCE (personal consumption expenditure) inflation that will be released in a couple of weeks. And recall that core PCE inflation is what the FOMC members seem to have their sights on. The good news is that our trend and year-over-year measures of CPI inflation fell by roughly 0.1 percentage points while core CPI inflation fell by around 0.2 percentage points. It would be reasonable to conjecture similar declines in PCE and core PCE inflation. Since our trend measures of these inflation series were 3.5% in March, we’re looking at 3.3 to 3.4% inflation. While inflation is moving in the “right” direction (at least for this one month), inflation is still running well above the Fed’s stated 2% target for core PCE inflation. While today’s news did not rule out a rate cut by the end of the year, it also did little to change anyone’s mind either.

April Employment Report

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

The BLS announced that payroll employment rose by 175,000. In addition, the BLS revised down previous estimates by a total of 22,000, down 34,000 in February but up 12,000 in March. Expectations by professional economists were in the 240,000 range. The slowing was evident pretty much across the board as can be seen in the charts below.

Employment gains in retail and health care, however, remained about the same over the last several months.

Temporary help services have been on a steady decline over the past two years, with only January this year showing an increase.

Average weekly hours of work fell from 34.4 to 34.3, leading to a decline in total hours of work.

The household survey showed an increase of 85,000 in the number employed, 63,000 more unemployed and no change in the labor force participation rate. The unemployment rate rose slightly from 3.83% to 3.86%.

Policy Outlook

The stock market shot up due to several events that occurred over the past week: Q1 GDP, PCE price index, Fed announcement after their meeting and today the employment report. We commented on the GDP and PCE price index reports here. Q1 GDP came in somewhat lower than expected and the PCE price index showed continued inflation pressures. Our bottom line was that while it may have slightly increased the probability of upcoming rate cuts, inflation was still stubbornly high. Indeed the FOMC statement contained the following comment, “The Committee does not expect it will be appropriate to reduce the target range until it has gained greater confidence that inflation is moving sustainably toward 2 percent.” Evidently, there has been no recent progress to that end.

Today’s jobs report seems to have the market increasing the odds of a rate cut by summer’s end. The WSJ called it “goldilocks job report for the Fed.” Does a downtick in employment lead to an imminent recession?

To “see through” the effects of the pandemic recession, we removed a set observations from March to September 2020, since those effects were massive. In the figure, months during which the NBER determined the economy was in an expansion, and for which the monthly employment change was less than 175,000 are marked with red dots. There’s a lot of red dots. Looking at periods when the economy did well for a prolonged period of time, 1960s, 1990s, 2010s, the current job numbers look similar. Staring at this figure, it’s difficult to put a lot of credence in the notion that low job gains precede recessions. Or, to borrow a phrase, low job gains have predicted 9 of the last 3 recessions.

Inflation and GDP

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

The Bureau of Economic Analysis announced that, on an annualized basis, the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index increased 3.94% and core PCE (excluding food and energy) — the Fed’s preferred measure — rose 3.86%, up from 3.24% in the previous month. As we have commented many times, the monthly numbers are quite volatile and therefore we calculate a “trend” measure that we feel better captures the underlying trend, shown in red below. Both the trend measures indicate an uptick in inflation. These higher PCE inflation numbers were foreshadowed by the CPI release from about two weeks ago.

Earlier in the week the Bureau of Economic Analysis released its advance estimate for first quarter GDP. Output growth has decelerated from 4.9% in the third quarter of 2003 to 3.4% in the fourth quarter of 2023 and 1.6% in the most recent quarter. Personal consumption expenditures increased 2.5% in the first quarter after increasing 3.3% in the previous quarter. Indeed, consumer spending on services was a driving force in the most recent report. Investment increased 3.2% with the residential component increasing 13.9%, the largest increase since the fourth quarter of 2020.

The table below breaks down output growth by the contributions of its major components. The contribution of, say, investment (0.6 percentage points) is given by its growth rate (3.2%) weighted by its share of GDP (18%). Between 2023Q3 and 2024Q1, output growth has fallen by 3.3 percentage points. Of this decline, 0.4 percentage points (2.1 – 1.7) is due to consumption. Investment contributed 1.2 percentage points; government 0.8 points; and exports and imports have both contributed 0.5 points. This tells us that the fall in output growth has occurred due to all components of output, with particularly large contributions by investment and government spending.

DateOutputConsumptionInvestmentGovernmentExportsImports
2023Q34.9%2.11.81.00.6-0.6
2023Q43.4%2.30.10.80.6-0.3
2024Q11.6%1.70.60.20.1-1.1
Notes: Output (GDP) growth, and contributions by its major components.

Outlook

Over the last few months the likely prospect of several interest rate cuts became dimmer due to a rise in the underlying inflation trend. Has the deceleration in GDP growth over the last couple of quarters increased the likelihood of a rate cut? Given the rising trend in inflation it does not seem likely that a rate cut will happen any time soon.

Our measure of trend core PCE inflation now stands at 3.5% — considerably higher than the FOMC’s 2% target, and moving in the wrong direction. Some may point to the slower output growth numbers as a signal of lower future inflation. But, arguably the right thing to do at this stage is to raise interest rates. However, the FOMC has painted itself into a corner with earlier promises of lower interest rates. While it’s tempting to point to the real side weakness to justify a rate cut, in the longer term, addressing inflation is the better course of action as we learned in the 1970s when the U.S. was hit by stagflation — a stagnating real side along with high inflation.