May Prices

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

Consumer Price Index

The BLS announced that the Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers (CPI-U) rose 0.1% in May on a seasonally adjusted basis. This 0.1% rise translates into an annualized 1.5%, well below the Fed’s 2% inflation target (the grey line in the figure below). Over the last 12 months it rose 4.13%. The preferred measure of Econsnapshot is a measure of inflation based on a 3 month interval. We prefer this measure because the year-over-year number moves very slowly while the month to month number is very volatile as seen in the graph below. This 3 month inflation rate grew at an annual rate of 2.2%, just above the Fed’s 2% target.

The bad news from the CPI report is that core CPI inflation — which strips out the more volatile food and energy prices — continues to run at 5% or more, much higher than the Fed’s target. Indeed, energy prices have declined significantly, down almost 12% year over year. When looking at core CPI over the last month it is the shelter component that was the largest contributor to the rise in prices, accounting for about 60% of the overall increase. One reason to look at core CPI inflation is that it may be a better measure of trend inflation than headline CPI. If so, the Fed still has work to do to bring inflation back to target.

Of course, Fed watchers know that the Fed focuses on inflation as measured by the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) price index. Over long periods of time, PCE and CPI inflation generally move together. That said, on average PCE inflation runs below both the CPI and core CPI. The PCE for May won’t be released until June 30. Consequently, the recent CPI inflation rates may provide useful information regarding the direction for PCE inflation.

Producer Price Index

Hard on the heels of the CPI report came that for the Producer Price Index (PPI). Inflation as measured by the PPI has been trending down since early 2022. Indeed, at an annual rate, the monthly and 3 month inflation rates are negative meaning that the price index has recently been falling.

Roughly speaking, the CPI reflects prices paid by the typical urban household while the PPI captures prices received by domestic producers of goods and services. Since the PPI captures prices received by domestic producers while the CPI measures prices paid by consumers, it’s tempting to conjecture that changes in the PPI will eventually be reflected in the CPI. However, there are differences in coverage which mean that this logic does not necessarily hold. For example, since the PPI measures prices received by US producers, it does not include prices of imports; the CPI does. Also, nearly 1/4 of the CPI includes the imputed rent of owner-occupied housing; this imputed rent is not included in the PPI. Finally, only some of the goods and services covered by the PPI represent purchases by consumers; the remainder are goods and services used by other producers, capital investment, exports and government. The Bureau of Economic Activity says that the PPI for Personal Consumption comes closest to the coverage of the CPI. Yet, the chart below shows that inflation as measured by this last measure is much more volatile than the CPI. The chart also shows that there is no obvious tendency for PPI inflation to lead CPI inflation.

Automotive Prices

Since the onset of the pandemic, much has been said and written about supply chain problems, with the automotive sector receiving particular attention, such as this article that makes several blunders and left out some important economics as well. Anyone who has tried to buy a new car knows that there are very long delivery lags, especially for electric vehicles. These issues in the new car market has spilled over into the used car market where prices have also risen. Keep in mind that a one time increase in the price of, say, new cars is not what we typically mean by `inflation’. To be sure, such a one time increase will, for a time, lead to an increase in measured inflation. However, this effect will dissipate with time. The chart below is based on price indices from the CPI. The used car inflation rate was much higher than that of new cars from mid-2020 to mid-2022. Recently, used car prices have been falling, and new car price inflation is moderating. Automotive maintenance and repair price inflation continues to increase.

Finally, turn again to the difference between the PPI and other price indices. From the PPI, prices received by domestic automotive producers grew rapidly through 2021 and 2022, with an inflation rate as high as 30%. While those prices have started to decline, the price level has risen 28.5% since May 2020. Granted, automotive inflation as measured by either the CPI or PCE price index also rose, but not nearly as much as recorded by the PPI, and the recent decline in PPI automotive prices has translated into a slowing of these prices as measured by the CPI and PCE.

The June 13-14 meeting of the Fed revealed a pause in rate hikes. As the graphs above show, there are certainly signs that the Fed’s early moves have worked in their favor. As we remarked above, given the core CPI numbers there still may be more work to do…and the Fed made it clear in the statement that more rate hikes are likely.

May Employment Report

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

The BLS announced that payroll employment climbed 339,000 in May. The private sector added 283,000. The bulk of the gain was in the service sector, adding 257,000. The goods sector increased 26,000 but almost all of it, 25,000, in construction.

Although employment climbed 339,000, average weekly hours fell from 34.4 to 34.3 (a decline of 0.1%), throwing a little cold water on the overall report. As shown in the chart below, average weekly hours have trended down since late 2020. Hourly pay, however, climbed 0.3%, from $34.33 to $34.44, and the year over year increase was 4.30%; unfortunately, that growth is still a bit below the year-over-year CPI inflation rate for April, 4.96% (the May CPI has not yet been released).

The household data showed almost exactly the opposite from the establishment survey with an employment decline of 310,000. The employment to population ratio fell slightly from 60.4 to 60.3, and still falls below the pre-pandemic level of 61.1.

The unemployment rate is based on data from the household survey. As mentioned above, employment fell by 310,000 according to the household survey. Combined with a 440,000 increase in the number of unemployed persons, the unemployment rate rose from 3.39% to 3.65%. The changes in the number of employed and unemployed left the labor force participation rate unchanged at 62.6%.

To be “officially” classified as unemployed, an individual must have “actively” looked for a job and available to begin employment. This definition excludes those who are deemed “marginally attached” to the labor force who would like a job, but have not taken sufficiently active measures to find one. The chart below plots the headline unemployment rate along with a measure that includes marginally attached individuals as well as those employed part time for economic reasons (the “U-6” definition). Whereas the headline unemployment rate is 3.7%, the broader measure of unemployment stands at 6.7%. The gap between the two, 3.0%, is about as low as it has been since 1994 when the U-6 measure of the unemployment rate starts.

Until the early 1980s, female unemployment tended to exceed that of men; since then, the pattern has reversed. Since 2021, the male unemployment rate has exceeded that of women by 0.17 percentage points.

Note: We use the terminology of the BLS so as not to add any confusion, in particular, Sex and Race. Also, the BLS uses the terminology Race and Hispanic or Latino Ethnicity.

Historically, Black and African American unemployment rates have exceeded that of other racial groups. Since 1973 (when the data becomes available), the Black and African American unemployment rate has averaged 6.1 percentage points higher than that of whites. Over time, this gap has narrowed; since 2021, it has averaged 3.1 percentage points. Hispanic and Latino unemployment rates lie between that of Blacks/African Americans and whites. (Note that we have seasonally adjusted the Hispanic and Latino unemployment rates using Python’s ARIMA X11 package with default settings; officially seasonally adjusted series are not available.) Over the available data, the Hispanic/Latino unemployment rate exceeded that of whites by 3.15 percentage points; since 2021, by 1.5 points. The Asian unemployment rate is only available since 2003. On average, their unemployment rate is 0.55 percentage points lower than that of whites; since 2021, the gap is only 0.09 points.

We can further look at unemployment rates by sex and race, albeit for those 20 years of age and older. As mentioned earlier, since the early 1980s, for the population as a whole the male unemployment rate has exceeded that of women. While the same is generally true for Blacks/African Americans and whites, the average unemployment rate for Hispanic/Latino women is 0.95 percentage points higher than that of Hispanic/Latino men. Data for Asians is not broken down by sex.

People enter unemployment through various channels. The largest component is for people who lose their job, that represents about half of all of the unemployed. The next largest category is from those who reenter the labor force after a spell of being absent; these are labeled reentrants. Then there are those that voluntarily leave their jobs and those who are just entering the labor force.

Looking across those unemployed, average weeks of unemployment has been trending up somewhat over time. Between 1950 to 1980 average weeks of unemployment hovered between 10 and 15 weeks. Indeed, average weeks never hit 20 weeks until after 1980. Since that time average weeks have hit 20 or more numerous times and today stands at just over 21. The Great Recession and the pandemic had massive effects on weeks of unemployment.

Overall, the labor market continues its strong performance. While the unemployment rate increased it still remains as low as the economy has seen for decades.