July Prices

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

The BLS announced that the all items CPI increased 0.2% over the month and 3.2% year over year. It is interesting to observe the various measures of “inflation” that appear in the media. For example, Bloomberg highlights the monthly change:

CNBC highlights the year over year change:

A New York Times columnist spotlights food prices:

Of course there are many others including the median CPI, trimmed mean CPI and the new “supercore” measure. What all of these analysts are trying to decipher is whether “inflation” has slowed enough to warrant a pause in the FED’s tightening spree. While there are many ways to parse the underlying data, such as the cost of eggs, milk and chicken, the preferred measure of the Econsnapshot is to look at the CPI over a 3-month horizon. Month to month the data is very volatile (hence the notion of core CPI that removes two very volatile components, food and energy) and year-over-year is very slow moving. As seen in the graph below, the annualized 3 month inflation is a bit under the FED’s 2.0% target at 1.9%. The year-over-year ticked up slightly.

The BEA recently released the July PPI (Producer Price Index). While the annualized one month change popped up from -0.5% to 3.6%, this series is very noisy; the annualized 3-month change came in at -0.2% for July, up from -0.6% in June.

In our May post on prices, we noted that the BEA points to the PPI for Consumption Expenditures as being closest in coverage to the CPI. Over the past three months, the annualized growth in this index was -6.8% indicating that by this measure, consumer prices are falling. Looking back a year, the index grew at a rate of -2.7%.

However, as we noted in May, there does not appear to be a very tight relationship between the growth of either of the PPI measures and either the CPI or core CPI.

Both the CPI and PPI measures point to a moderation in prices. Given that, it seems likely that the Fed will take a pause and let the economy speak a little more before a move in either direction.

July Employment Update

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

The BLS announced the employment situation for July. The establishment data showed a 187,000 increase in total nonfarm employment, 172,000 of which was in the private sector. Private service producing employment gained 154,000. Employment gains in May were revised down by 25,000 to 281,000 while June was revised down by 24,000 to 185,000.

Roughly 1/3 of July’s employment gains were in health care (63,000); the rest was fairly evenly distributed across sectors. There were a few declines in employment: nondurable goods, transportation and warehousing, information, to name a few, but the largest came in temporary help services that has seen eight out of the last nine months with a decline.

Average hours of work fell from 34.4 to 34.3 and combining that with the smallish increase in employment led to a fall in total hours of work. Average hourly earnings rose by $0.14 to $33.74

The household survey data from the BLS revealed a 268,000 increase in employment and 116,000 fewer people unemployed. There was almost no change in the labor force participation rate and the employment to population ratio increased slightly. The unemployment rate declined from 3.57% to 3.50%.

The Jobs Openings and Labor Turnover Summary showed almost no change in the rate of job openings, hires and separations. The number of job openings is still much higher than the number of people unemployed. There are roughly 1.64 job openings for each unemployed person.

The fairly weak recent jobs data does not provide much guidance as to how the Fed might respond. Had the reports been very strong it would have likely given reasons to continue to jack up the funds rate. Conversely had the reports been really weak, a pause would be likely. The decision will become clearer as the price data come in.

2023Q2: GDP, PCE Inflation and the Employment Cost Index

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

The BEA release of the advance estimate of Q2 Real GDP showed an increase of 2.4% at a seasonally adjusted annual rate. The BEA noted:

The increase in real GDP reflected increases in consumer spending, nonresidential fixed investment, state and local government spending, private inventory investment, and federal government spending that were partly offset by decreases in exports and residential fixed investment. Imports, which are a subtraction in the calculation of GDP, decreased.

Bureau of Economic Analysis, July 27, 2023

The 1.6% increase in Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) represented nearly half of the contribution to overall growth, due to the fact that consumption is about 70% of total output. Real non-residential fixed investment increased 7.7% while real residential fixed investment declined 4.2%.

On a year-over-year basis, inflation as measured by the Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index is the lowest since mid-2022, rising 3.0%, a full percentage point over the Fed’s 2% target. However, as emphasized in earlier posts to this blog, year-over-year measures are quite sluggish. Our preferred measure, the 3-month annualized inflation rate, is 2.5% in June, slightly higher than the 2.3% recorded in May. For what it’s worth, the 1-month annualized PCE inflation rate in June was 2.0%, up from May’s 1.5%.

As an aside, it seems curious to us that commentators are quite comfortable annualizing quarterly growth rates (as emphasized by the headline numbers for GDP growth), but are reticent to do the same with price data (for which headlines compute 12-month growth rates). Perhaps consistency is too much to ask.

What’s significant is that output growth accelerated from 2.0% in the first quarter of 2023 to 2.4% in the second quarter. In this context, the BEA’s discussion of the second quarter, quoted above, is strange. The BEA focused on the fact that GDP increased, listing off the major components that contributed to this increase (consumption, investment, government spending and imports) while noting those that detracted from the increase (exports and residential investment); see the following table.

Quarter 1Quarter 2
Output2.0%2.4%
Consumption4.2%1.6%
Investment-11.9%5.7%
– Non-residential0.6%7.7%
– Structures15.8%9.7%
– Equipment-8.9%10.8%
– Intellectual Property3.1%3.9%
– Residential-4.0%-4.2%
Government5.0%2.6%
Exports7.8%-10.8%
Imports2.0%-7.8%

But why did output growth increase? The answer lies principally in the swings in investment and imports growth. Investment growth rose from -11.9% to 5.7%, transforming it from a drag on output growth to a contributor. Drilling deeper into investment, the growth rate of residential investment was largely unchanged (-4.0% to -4.2%). The big increase in non-residential investment growth was driven principally by investment in equipment, rising from -8.9% to 10.8%. To be sure, the growth in non-residential structures was very strong (9.7%), but it grew even faster in the first quarter (15.8%).

The growth rate of imports fell from 2.0% to -7.8%. However, since imports enter with a negative sign in the output identify, Y=C+I+G+X-M, the lower growth rate of imports contributed positively to output growth.

As noted by the BEA, growth of exports was negative in the second quarter (-10.8%) while it was positive in the first quarter (7.8%). While growth of consumption and government spending were both positive, their growth rates fell which has the effect of lowering quarter two output growth relative to the first quarter.

Overall, the strong growth in GDP coupled with the subdued (though still above the 2% target) price change shows a still-resilient real economy that is disregarding the increases in the Fed Funds rate. Based on available data, it is hard to make the case for a nascent recession in the U.S.

Personal Income

On Friday, the Bureau of Economic Analysis released personal income data. Real personal income growth fell from 8.5% in the first quarter to 2.5% in the second (both at annualized rates).

Disposable income data is also available on a monthly basis. The chart below shows that the first quarter was driven by very strong growth in January (21.9%) while the second quarter was hampered by negative growth in April (-0.4%).

Employment Cost Index

On Friday, the Bureau of Economic Analysis also released updated employment cost index data. Growth in the wages and salaries component fell from 4.9% in the first quarter to 4.1% in the second.

Overall, the current data suggest that the real economy continues to chug along at a respectable clip and the price numbers indicate that Fed policy is helping push down inflation. The Fed has indicated that the round of tightening is not yet over and the strength of the real economy gives no reason to alter that view.

June Prices

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

The BLS announced the CPI and PPI for June. The CPI rose 0.18% from May to June on a seasonally adjusted basis, 2.18% when annualized, and was up 3.1% year over year. Rather than strip out a lot of goods that comprise the CPI, we look at the CPI on a three month average basis. As shown in the graph, the year over year continues to decline while both the annualized monthly and the 3 month ticked up slightly. The CPI-X (ex food and energy) differs, however. The annualized monthly rate grew 1.91%, below the Fed’s 2% target.

Of course, the question the Fed faces comes down to: What has been happening to the trend in inflation? Given the 2% target, the Fed hopes to see progress toward that goal. But, as we have commented on in several previous posts, what measure of inflation is the best indicator? Headline CPI (PCE)? Core CPI (PCE)? The Fed’s new Supercore CPI (PCE) (the price of services excluding energy and housing services)? Paul Krugman (NYT, July 11) has his own measure of supercore: “My preferred measure these days is “supercore,” which excludes food, energy, used cars and shelter (because official measures of housing costs still reflect a rent surge that ended a year ago.)” And goes on to say he is not a fan of the Fed’s measure, “The Fed has a different measure of supercore — non-housing services — but when you look at the details of that indicator, it’s a dog’s breakfast of poorly measured components that I find hard to take seriously.” Here is a graph of the Fed’s supercore measure:

So what are we to make of all of this? The main problem is that all of these measures are purely arbitrary; there is no underlying theory as to how, or what to measure. The BLS states, “Inflation can be defined as the overall general upward price movement of goods and services in an economy. The U.S. Department of Labor’s BLS has various indexes that measure different aspects of inflation.” These new so-called supercore measures omit various categories of goods that are purchased in the market. The overall CPI is comprised of 243 commodities and services measured in 32 different geographic areas. To show just how big these omissions are, the following table recreates a subset of the BLS table where the relative importance is the share of total expenditure used to weight the respective change and the May 2023-June 2023 column gives the monthly change:

Expenditure categoryRelative importanceMay 2023-June 2023
All items100%0.2
Food13.4%0.1
Energy6.9%0.6
All items less food and energy79.7%0.2
Services less energy services58.3%0.3
Shelter34.7%0.4

The table above shows that the core CPI includes about 79.7% of all expenditures. Removing shelter from the core means the price measure includes only 45% of the things we buy. If only services prices are included that would vastly reduce the set of prices used to calculate inflation.

The BLS announced that the Producer Price Index (PPI) for final demand increased 0.1% from May to June or 1.65% annualized. Year over year it increased 0.24%. Our 3 month measure fell -0.69%, the third consecutive month with a decline.

Trend Inflation

What we (the writers of this blog) mean by “trend inflation” is a series that tracks the movements of actual monthly inflation but somewhat smoothed (taking out the more extreme fluctuations). As we’ve discussed before, this is a signal-extraction problem. Every month, we get a new CPI number from which we want to make an inference concerning the current trend inflation rate. Trend inflation is the “signal”. However, the news (the new CPI number) is a noisy indicator of this signal, both because the CPI is reported in levels and because of transitory factors affecting monthly inflation. Further, the nature of the data is such that we cannot easily extract the signal (trend inflation) from the data. With all of this in mind, the reason for looking at core or supercore CPI inflation is that it has a higher signal-to-noise ratio than CPI inflation. Both seem promising in that they omit the more volatile price components of CPI: in the case of core CPI, food and energy; in the case of super core CPI, lots of other stuff. However, the charts above show that over the past couple of years, core CPI inflation has been running well above actual CPI inflation while the Fed’s supercore inflation has been well below actual.

An alternative to slicing and dicing CPI is to compute inflation over a horizon longer than a month. The idea in this case is that the monthly noise is an independent draw (in the jargon of economics, it’s independently and identically distributed) while trend inflation has memory and changes relatively slowly over time. Consider headline inflation. Typically, it’s calculated as the 12 month percentage change in the CPI. But a different way to think about this calculation is as the average of the 12 one month inflation rates. If there is no change in trend inflation over this period of time, the 12 noise terms will have a mean of roughly zero, and the year-over-year inflation rate will provide a good estimate of trend inflation. The rub is that there have been changes in trend inflation over the past couple of years. Consequently, the year-over-year inflation rate also takes an average of trend inflation over the past year. This is why, in the chart above, year-over-year inflation has consistently exceeded the monthly inflation rate for the last year and a half.

But there’s nothing magic about year-over-year inflation rates, and we’ve previously advocated for annualizing the three month inflation rate as a good compromise between capturing changes in trend in a timely fashion, and seeing through the noise in monthly inflation rates. By construction, the three month inflation rate tracks movements in monthly inflation while removing much of the noise – as can be seen in the chart above. One thing that the three month inflation rate lacks is a fancy name like supercore; oh, and the NYT soap box.

Labor Market Data

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

The BLS released the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) for May on July 6. The data reveal a pretty mixed view. Job openings fell 496,000 and now stands at 9.8 million vacancies. The number of unemployed workers in May was 6.1 million so that there were 1.6 jobs available for each unemployed worker.

The JOLTS data also contains information on the rate at which workers are hired, laid off, quit and job openings. The rates are determined by dividing by the level of employment. The JOLTS covers about 95% of all nonfarm payroll jobs in the US. While the openings rate declined the hiring rate and the quit rate rose. The layoff rate remains at one of its lowest rates since the inception of the JOLTS in December of 2000. Note that all of the other rates are well above their historic average.

The JOLTS data provides some evidence for those looking for nascent signs of a recession. Quit and hiring rates fell through the March-November 2001 and December 2007-June 2009 recessions, and both series started falling prior to the latter recession. The declining quit and hiring rates since early 2022 fit this pattern. Unfortunately, JOLTS only covers three recessions, so it’s tough to make much of the historic precedents, particularly since the February-April 2020 recession was due to COVID-19. Another potentially confounding factor is that both quits and hires are at historically high rates, and the recent declines may be due to reversion to the mean.

The data on initial and continued claims for unemployment insurance also came out on July 6. Initial claims rose slightly but remain relatively subdued. Continued claims have been trending down over the past few months.

On July 7, the employment situation report for June was released by the BLS and showed a payroll employment increase of 209,000 but downward revisions for April and May totaling 110,000 for the two months. One way to think about these changes is that roughly half of the employment gains reported for June were offset by the downward revisions in the previous two months. The employment change in the private sector was the smallest increase over the past couple of years.

The phrase “little changed” was peppered throughout the press release for the Employment Situation Report. The report highlighted gains in employment in government (60,000), health care (41,000), social assistance (24,000) and construction (23,000). Yet the gains in professional and business services, and leisure and hospitality (both 21,000) were described as “little changed”. It would seem that the difference between a gain warranting notice, and “little changed” is 22,000.

Average hours worked in the non-farm sector inched up 0.1 hours to 34.4. That increase, combined with the increase in private employment led to about a 5% in total hours of work in the private sector. There was little change in average hourly earnings.

One way to combine data from JOLTS and the employment report is through the Beveridge curve which plots the vacancy rate (from JOLTS) against the unemployment rate (the household survey). As seen in the chart below, the data up to and including the Great Recession (2007-09) appears to lie on a stable Beveridge curve. After the Great Recession, the Beveridge curve shifted out. And after the pandemic, the Beveridge curve shifted out yet again, with the most recent data in the north west quadrant. One interpretation of an outward shift in the Beveridge curve is that it reflects lower efficiency in the matching process between jobs and workers. Under this interpretation, at a given level of unemployment, firms need to post more vacancies in order to fill jobs. An alternative interpretation is that the outward shifts in the Beveridge curve are due to lower costs of recruiting workers: firms post more vacancies because doing so is simply much cheaper that in the past. One way to distinguish between these two alternative interpretations is to look at how quickly vacancies are filled: less efficient matching says it should take longer while lower job posting costs implies a shorter period of time. Unfortunately, the speed at which vacancies are filled is no longer available.

According to the BLS household survey, employment increased 273,000, the number of people unemployed fell by 140,000 and the labor force increased by 133,000. The participation rate and employment to population ratio were unchanged. The unemployment rate fell from 3.65% to 3.57%.

PCE Inflation and Revised GDP for Quarter 1

The BEA announced May PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditure) data that reinforces the earlier CPI (Consumer Price Index) report: Inflation continues to creep down. Annualizing the month-over-month change in the PCE, inflation for May was 1.55%, well below the Fed’s 2% target. As we have commented before, these month-to-month changes contain a lot of noise and our preferred measure is the annualized 3 month change. By this measure, inflation for May was 2.45% – somewhat higher than the 2.2% reported earlier for the CPI. The headline year-over-year PCE inflation rate for May was 3.85%. As we have emphasized in previous posts, this year-over-year measure of inflation is slow to respond to changes in trend which means it will take some time for the year-over-year inflation rates to reflect the lower inflation rates that have come in over recent months.

Less rosy is the inflation picture coming from core PCE (that is, excluding food and energy). While the month-over-month rate was down in May – from 4.65% to 3.84% – the year-over-year and 3 month measures fell by roughly 0.1 percentage points. Presumably, the reason to look at core PCE inflation is that it provides a better gauge of underlying trend inflation than non-core PCE measures. But for our money, the 3 month PCE inflation rate does a good job capturing developments in trend inflation.

For June, expected inflation is now running below 2% at all horizons. Collectively, the results for CPI, PCE and expected inflation suggest that the tightening of monetary policy over the past year-and-a-half has brought down both actual and expected inflation. In this context, the Fed’s decision in June to pause its tightening of monetary policy seems like a good one, especially if one takes into account the well-known long and variable lags of the effects of monetary policy on the economy.

Finally, while we at Economic Snapshot usually do not comment on GDP (Gross Domestic Product) revisions, we are making an exception for the data released on Thursday by the BEA. The output revision was a very large 0.7 percentage points, from 1.27% to 2.00%. This upward revision of output can be attributed to upward revisions in consumption and exports, and a downward revision of imports (which has a positive effect on output since imports are subtracted from output). These effects were partially offset by small revisions in investment and government spending.

Second
Revision
Third
Revision
Difference
Output1.272.00+0.73
Consumption2.652.93+0.28
Investment-2.10-2.17-0.07
Government0.880.85-0.03
Exports0.661.00+0.33
Imports-0.75-0.37+0.38
GDP growth for the first quarter of 2023, and contributions to GDP growth by its major components.

The increase in real GDP was widespread according to the state GDP estimates. Real GDP increased in all 50 states in Q1. The largest increase came in North Dakota, 12.4% at annual rate and the lowest in Rhode Island and Alabama at 0.1%. Personal income increased in all but two states, Indiana (-1.0%) and Massachusetts (-0.9%).

May Prices

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

Consumer Price Index

The BLS announced that the Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers (CPI-U) rose 0.1% in May on a seasonally adjusted basis. This 0.1% rise translates into an annualized 1.5%, well below the Fed’s 2% inflation target (the grey line in the figure below). Over the last 12 months it rose 4.13%. The preferred measure of Econsnapshot is a measure of inflation based on a 3 month interval. We prefer this measure because the year-over-year number moves very slowly while the month to month number is very volatile as seen in the graph below. This 3 month inflation rate grew at an annual rate of 2.2%, just above the Fed’s 2% target.

The bad news from the CPI report is that core CPI inflation — which strips out the more volatile food and energy prices — continues to run at 5% or more, much higher than the Fed’s target. Indeed, energy prices have declined significantly, down almost 12% year over year. When looking at core CPI over the last month it is the shelter component that was the largest contributor to the rise in prices, accounting for about 60% of the overall increase. One reason to look at core CPI inflation is that it may be a better measure of trend inflation than headline CPI. If so, the Fed still has work to do to bring inflation back to target.

Of course, Fed watchers know that the Fed focuses on inflation as measured by the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) price index. Over long periods of time, PCE and CPI inflation generally move together. That said, on average PCE inflation runs below both the CPI and core CPI. The PCE for May won’t be released until June 30. Consequently, the recent CPI inflation rates may provide useful information regarding the direction for PCE inflation.

Producer Price Index

Hard on the heels of the CPI report came that for the Producer Price Index (PPI). Inflation as measured by the PPI has been trending down since early 2022. Indeed, at an annual rate, the monthly and 3 month inflation rates are negative meaning that the price index has recently been falling.

Roughly speaking, the CPI reflects prices paid by the typical urban household while the PPI captures prices received by domestic producers of goods and services. Since the PPI captures prices received by domestic producers while the CPI measures prices paid by consumers, it’s tempting to conjecture that changes in the PPI will eventually be reflected in the CPI. However, there are differences in coverage which mean that this logic does not necessarily hold. For example, since the PPI measures prices received by US producers, it does not include prices of imports; the CPI does. Also, nearly 1/4 of the CPI includes the imputed rent of owner-occupied housing; this imputed rent is not included in the PPI. Finally, only some of the goods and services covered by the PPI represent purchases by consumers; the remainder are goods and services used by other producers, capital investment, exports and government. The Bureau of Economic Activity says that the PPI for Personal Consumption comes closest to the coverage of the CPI. Yet, the chart below shows that inflation as measured by this last measure is much more volatile than the CPI. The chart also shows that there is no obvious tendency for PPI inflation to lead CPI inflation.

Automotive Prices

Since the onset of the pandemic, much has been said and written about supply chain problems, with the automotive sector receiving particular attention, such as this article that makes several blunders and left out some important economics as well. Anyone who has tried to buy a new car knows that there are very long delivery lags, especially for electric vehicles. These issues in the new car market has spilled over into the used car market where prices have also risen. Keep in mind that a one time increase in the price of, say, new cars is not what we typically mean by `inflation’. To be sure, such a one time increase will, for a time, lead to an increase in measured inflation. However, this effect will dissipate with time. The chart below is based on price indices from the CPI. The used car inflation rate was much higher than that of new cars from mid-2020 to mid-2022. Recently, used car prices have been falling, and new car price inflation is moderating. Automotive maintenance and repair price inflation continues to increase.

Finally, turn again to the difference between the PPI and other price indices. From the PPI, prices received by domestic automotive producers grew rapidly through 2021 and 2022, with an inflation rate as high as 30%. While those prices have started to decline, the price level has risen 28.5% since May 2020. Granted, automotive inflation as measured by either the CPI or PCE price index also rose, but not nearly as much as recorded by the PPI, and the recent decline in PPI automotive prices has translated into a slowing of these prices as measured by the CPI and PCE.

The June 13-14 meeting of the Fed revealed a pause in rate hikes. As the graphs above show, there are certainly signs that the Fed’s early moves have worked in their favor. As we remarked above, given the core CPI numbers there still may be more work to do…and the Fed made it clear in the statement that more rate hikes are likely.

May Employment Report

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

The BLS announced that payroll employment climbed 339,000 in May. The private sector added 283,000. The bulk of the gain was in the service sector, adding 257,000. The goods sector increased 26,000 but almost all of it, 25,000, in construction.

Although employment climbed 339,000, average weekly hours fell from 34.4 to 34.3 (a decline of 0.1%), throwing a little cold water on the overall report. As shown in the chart below, average weekly hours have trended down since late 2020. Hourly pay, however, climbed 0.3%, from $34.33 to $34.44, and the year over year increase was 4.30%; unfortunately, that growth is still a bit below the year-over-year CPI inflation rate for April, 4.96% (the May CPI has not yet been released).

The household data showed almost exactly the opposite from the establishment survey with an employment decline of 310,000. The employment to population ratio fell slightly from 60.4 to 60.3, and still falls below the pre-pandemic level of 61.1.

The unemployment rate is based on data from the household survey. As mentioned above, employment fell by 310,000 according to the household survey. Combined with a 440,000 increase in the number of unemployed persons, the unemployment rate rose from 3.39% to 3.65%. The changes in the number of employed and unemployed left the labor force participation rate unchanged at 62.6%.

To be “officially” classified as unemployed, an individual must have “actively” looked for a job and available to begin employment. This definition excludes those who are deemed “marginally attached” to the labor force who would like a job, but have not taken sufficiently active measures to find one. The chart below plots the headline unemployment rate along with a measure that includes marginally attached individuals as well as those employed part time for economic reasons (the “U-6” definition). Whereas the headline unemployment rate is 3.7%, the broader measure of unemployment stands at 6.7%. The gap between the two, 3.0%, is about as low as it has been since 1994 when the U-6 measure of the unemployment rate starts.

Until the early 1980s, female unemployment tended to exceed that of men; since then, the pattern has reversed. Since 2021, the male unemployment rate has exceeded that of women by 0.17 percentage points.

Note: We use the terminology of the BLS so as not to add any confusion, in particular, Sex and Race. Also, the BLS uses the terminology Race and Hispanic or Latino Ethnicity.

Historically, Black and African American unemployment rates have exceeded that of other racial groups. Since 1973 (when the data becomes available), the Black and African American unemployment rate has averaged 6.1 percentage points higher than that of whites. Over time, this gap has narrowed; since 2021, it has averaged 3.1 percentage points. Hispanic and Latino unemployment rates lie between that of Blacks/African Americans and whites. (Note that we have seasonally adjusted the Hispanic and Latino unemployment rates using Python’s ARIMA X11 package with default settings; officially seasonally adjusted series are not available.) Over the available data, the Hispanic/Latino unemployment rate exceeded that of whites by 3.15 percentage points; since 2021, by 1.5 points. The Asian unemployment rate is only available since 2003. On average, their unemployment rate is 0.55 percentage points lower than that of whites; since 2021, the gap is only 0.09 points.

We can further look at unemployment rates by sex and race, albeit for those 20 years of age and older. As mentioned earlier, since the early 1980s, for the population as a whole the male unemployment rate has exceeded that of women. While the same is generally true for Blacks/African Americans and whites, the average unemployment rate for Hispanic/Latino women is 0.95 percentage points higher than that of Hispanic/Latino men. Data for Asians is not broken down by sex.

People enter unemployment through various channels. The largest component is for people who lose their job, that represents about half of all of the unemployed. The next largest category is from those who reenter the labor force after a spell of being absent; these are labeled reentrants. Then there are those that voluntarily leave their jobs and those who are just entering the labor force.

Looking across those unemployed, average weeks of unemployment has been trending up somewhat over time. Between 1950 to 1980 average weeks of unemployment hovered between 10 and 15 weeks. Indeed, average weeks never hit 20 weeks until after 1980. Since that time average weeks have hit 20 or more numerous times and today stands at just over 21. The Great Recession and the pandemic had massive effects on weeks of unemployment.

Overall, the labor market continues its strong performance. While the unemployment rate increased it still remains as low as the economy has seen for decades.

April 2023: CPI and Employment

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

The April employment report was released by the BLS and revealed a 253,000 increase in payrolls. However, there were downward revisions totaling 149,000 (down 78,000 in February and 71,000 in March) that threw a little cold water on the report. There were few sectors that had any decline except for temporary help services that shed 23,300 jobs. The workweek held steady at 34.4 hours so that total hours worked increased by 2.1%.

Measured over the past year, average hourly earnings rose 4.45% in April, up from 4.3%. However, when measured relative to the previous month, earnings growth accelerated from 3.3% to 5.9%. As the figure below shows, month-to-month growth rates for earnings are quite choppy. The 3 month change is somewhat smoother; measured this way, earnings growth rose from 3.4% to 4.3%.

The household survey showed that the labor force participation rate remained at 62.6% despite the labor force falling 43,000. The employment to population ratio was also unchanged at 60.4%. The unemployment rate fell from 3.50% to 3.39%.

Unemployment insurance claims spiked up to 264,000, the highest since October of 2021. Continued claims, however, were little changed.

Between March and April, there was little change in inflation as measured by 12 month percentage change in either the Consumer Price Index (CPI) or core CPI (excluding food and energy). However, the annualized monthly percentage change in the CPI rose from 0.6% to 4.5% while core CPI rose from 4.7% to 5.0%. As we have stressed in earlier posts, these annualized inflation rates are quite volatile while 12 month percentage changes respond sluggishly to changes in trend. The 3 month annualized percentage changes strike us as a good compromise between smoothing and quickly capturing trend changes. On this basis, CPI inflation was down slightly, from 3.8% in March to 3.2% in April; core CPI inflation was essentially unchanged at 5.1%. All of these measures of CPI inflation are currently running well above the Fed’s target of 2%.

Given that CPI inflation is higher than the Fed’s 2% target, it may not be surprising that inflation expectations similarly exceed this 2% target. While the May readings for the 1 year and 2 year expected inflation are unchanged at 2.65% and 2.4%, respectively, the 5 year and 10 year expectations rose marginally.

It seems that monetary policymakers no longer look at what’s happening to money growth. That the Fed changed its definition of monetary aggregates starting in May 2020 makes it difficult to take a long view on money growth. Nonetheless, since May 2021 (given the change in the definition of “money” in May 2020, the earliest date for which year-over-year growth rates can sensibly be computed) growth of the monetary aggregates M1 and M2 has slowed. Indeed, both have been contracting since late 2022. A traditional monetarist like Milton Friedman would likely look at the chart below and predict future deflation. One way to think through all this is via the quantity theory of money: Mv = PY where M is money, v velocity, P the price level, and Y real output. This relationship can be recast as: money growth + velocity growth = inflation + real output growth. If velocity is roughly constant (so that its growth rate is 0), and long run real output growth is constant, the quantity theory of money predicts a tight relationship between money growth and inflation. As Milton Friedman put it, “Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.”

Of course, there have been important developments within the banking system. One such development is that the Fed now pays interest on excess reserves of banks held at the Federal Reserve Banks (“excess” meaning above-and-beyond what is required to satisfy reserve requirements). Plausibly, changes in the gap between this interest rate on reserves and the Federal Funds Rate (the rate banks pay in an overnight market for reserves) might explain the above deceleration of money growth. However, as shown below, the interest rate on reserves and the Fed Funds Rate move in lock step.

2023 Q1 GDP Report

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

The BEA announced that Q1 real GDP increased 1.1% at an annual rate. Many in the press have, obviously, noted the declines over the last two quarters indicates the economy is slowing. Indeed, today’s report “undershot” expectations that were around 2%. However, the underlying components were a bit more mixed and the strength of the economy might be in the eye of the beholder. Real consumption spending increased 3.7%, the largest increase over the last 7 quarters, and disposable personal income rose 8.0%.

The output identity, Y = C + I + G + X – M, tells us the uses of output (the “demand” side). If output growth is down, then one or more of the right-hand side components must be down. From above, consumption growth rose from 1.0% in the fourth quarter to 3.7% in the first quarter. Growth in government spending likewise rose, from 3.8% to 4.7%. However, real investment spending fell 12.5% in the first quarter compared to a 4.5% increase in the fourth quarter. Within real investment, real inventories grew 0.4% (up from -3.7%), non-residential structure investment grew 11.2%, and residential structure investment fell by 4.2% (although this decrease was an improvement over the very negative growth rates for this category late in 2022).

While it has become standard in the U.S. to annualize the quarterly growth in GDP, one could also look at the year-over-year growth rate. Now, Q1 does not look so bad relative to the past few quarters and, in fact, has actually increased over the previous quarter.

The Personal Consumption Expenditure Price Index (PCE) rose 4.2% in the first quarter compared to growing 3.7% in the previous quarter, obviously high above the FOMC’s 2.0% target.

These developments lead to a murkier monetary policy outlook. Output growth has slowed, perhaps reflecting the cumulative effects of monetary policy tightening over the past year. Yet, PCE inflation is still well above the Fed’s 2% target (see also the CPI and PPI), and consumption growth actually accelerated in the first quarter. In previous posts, we have noted that the labor market is still quite strong, with an historically low unemployment rate, and roughly two job openings for every unemployed person. Given that, there is nothing new to dissuade the FOMC from another rate hike or two.