Feburary CPI

The annual (12 month-over-12 month) inflation rate as measured by the CPI rose marginally, from 3.11% to 3.17% in February. Taking out the volatile food and energy components, core CPI inflation was down marginally, from 3.87% to 3.76%. So, overall no change? As we have emphasized in the past, annual inflation rates respond sluggishly to changes in trend. The monthly annualized CPI inflation rate rose smartly, from 3.73% to 5.44% while annualized core CPI inflation fell from 4.81% to 4.39%. As we have previously discussed, monthly inflation rates are quite variable. Our trend measure of CPI inflation popped up from 3.06% to 3.85%; trend core CPI inflation saw an upturn from 3.89% to 4.06%.

Policy Outlook

The FOMC tends to look at core PCE inflation, not CPI inflation. However, the PCE data for February will be released in a couple of weeks. Given the overlap in the goods and services covered by the CPI and PCE, the February CPI report provides some “news” regarding the likely direction of the upcoming PCE data. Sorry folks, but the short term prospects for interest rate cuts are dim. At the horizons we report, PCE inflation for January exceeded the Fed’s 2% target, whether overall or the core measure. Given that the February CPI data shows an increase in inflation, it seems unlikely that PCE inflation for February will be heading down towards 2%, and may well be up from January. The Fed is unlikely to let inflation get out of hand as it did in 2020. At this juncture, it’s easier to make a case to raise, not lower, interest rates, especially since the real economy (labor market, productivity and GDP) has not shown signs of weakening.

February Employment Situation

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

The establishment data from the BLS showed a 275,000 increase in payroll employment for February, outpacing the 230,000 average over the previous 12 months. The payroll data for January and December were revised down by a total of 167,000. The private sector added 223,000 new jobs, the largest gain since May of last year.

Temporary help services employment continues a steep decline after a sharp post-pandemic rise.

Average hours of work increased from 34.2 to 34.3. The increase, along with the 223,000 private employment increase led to a hefty increase in total hours of 5.6% at an annualized rate, also the largest increase since May of last year.

The establishment report, once again, beat “expectations;” the WSJ survey of economists was 198,000. Other than the downward revisions, mentioned above, another bit of negative news was a smallish increase in wage growth, from $34.52 to $34.57.

The household survey shows that the labor force increased 150,000, a drop in employment of 184,000 and an increase in the number of unemployed persons of 334,000. The labor force participation rate held steady at 62.5, the employment to population ratio decreased from 60.2 to 60.1 and the unemployment rate increased from 3.66 to 3.86. Remember that the unemployment rate is the number of unemployed relative to the labor force (the number employed plus the number unemployed). Consequently, the unemployment rate can go up if the number of unemployed rises holding fixed the labor force, or if the labor force shrinks holding the number unemployed unchanged. An increase in the unemployment rate is not necessarily a bad thing: it may reflect a strong labor market drawing “marginally attached” individuals from outside the labor force. Indeed, there was a 96,000 decline in those workers.

Earlier in the week, the BLS announced JOLTS (Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey) data for January. There isn’t much to report here as the job openings changed little at 8.9 million, the number of hires and total separations were little changed at 5.7 million and 5.3 million, respectively.

As has been the case for the last couple of years, the number of job openings remains higher than the number of unemployed persons.

Also earlier in the week the BLS announced that productivity increased 3.2% in the 4th quarter with output rising 3.5% and hours of work rising 0.3%.

The bottom line is that the labor market continues its surprisingly (to some) strong performance, once again proving stronger than many had expected. This strength makes it difficult to justify any interest rate cuts soon, particularly given the recent inflation spike.

January PCE

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

The BEA announced that the Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) price index rose 0.3 percent over the month, 4.22 percent on an annualized basis. While the monthly spike was high, the year over year number fell from 2.62 percent to 2.40 percent. Our preferred trend measure rose from 1.57 percent to 2.45 percent.

As we mentioned in the CPI post of February 14, given the relationship between changes in the CPI and PCE it was expected that the PCE would also likely rise. In terms of policy, the Fed tends to concentrate more on the core PCE index. The core measure also blipped up, the annualized monthly number came in at 5.10 percent for January after a 1.75 percent December number. Year over year the core measure fell slightly, from 2.94 percent to 2.85 percent. Our calculated trend inflation came in at 2.99 percent after a 1.94 percent December reading.

At least some news outlets have emphasized the decrease in the year-over-year PCE inflation rate, with the pop up in the monthly, annualized rate treated as an afterthought. As the saying goes, ”Those who forget their history are condemned to repeat it.” In 2021, monthly inflation started running well above the FOMC’s 2% target; it took at least half a year before the 12 month inflation rate reflected this increase. While one month doesn’t make a trend, the size of the increase makes it difficult to build a strong case for loosening monetary policy in the near term. We will be looking closely at the CPI report that comes out in a couple of weeks time.

Inflation Report

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

The BLS announced the January inflation report on February 13, indicating that the CPI rose 3.73% in January on a seasonally adjusted annualized basis. This was much larger than December’s increase of 2.83%. As we have mentioned several times, the one month number is extremely volatile and therefore should not necessarily be a sign of trend inflation on the rise. Having said that, our preferred measure of trend inflation also increased slightly from 2.73% to 3.06%.

A large part of the increase came from the shelter component rising over 7% and is about 36% of a household’s expenditures. Energy components fell somewhat. Yet, core CPI inflation rose from 3.35% in December to 4.81% in January (monthly annualized rates). Our measure of trend core CPI inflation also rose, from 3.43% to 3.89%.

The only bright spot to the CPI report is that year-over-year inflation declined. However, as we learned a couple of years ago, this measure is very slow to respond to changes in trend.

What does the CPI report imply for policy? To start, the Fed’s 2% inflation target is for core PCE (personal consumption expenditures) inflation, not (core) CPI inflation. PCE data for January will not be released until February 29. While the year-over-year core PCE inflation rate for January may fall, based on higher trend CPI inflation, it seems likely that trend core PCE inflation will likewise rise. The Fed will probably want to see a steady decline in underlying inflation toward its target before lowering its interest rate. It seems unlikely that the Fed will be lowering rates soon.

January Employment Report and Other Releases

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

The US economy once again fools forecasters. The BLS announced that payroll employment increased 353,000 in January, with 317,000 added to private payrolls…about twice the Dow Jones prediction. In addition, December employment was revised up 117,000 and November up 9,000. Overall, growth was pretty widespread as the diffusion index (percent of industries increasing employment plus one-half of those with unchanged employment) rose from 64.0% to 65.6%.

However, not all in the report was good news. Average hours worked plunged to 34.1 from 34.4. Outside of the pandemic months, the 34.1 reading was the lowest since coming out of the Great Recession. The drop in average hours in combination with the 317,000 lead to a 4.1% decline in total hours of work.

The unemployment rate dipped from 3.74% to 3.66%.

January 30: Jolts

The Job Openings and Labor Turnover Summary (JOLTS) for December was released on Tuesday. The number of job openings increased slightly from 8.925 million to 9.026 million. New hires increased to 5.621 million and separations declined to 5.365 million. Moreover, there are still about 3 million more job openings than unemployed job searchers.

The Beveridge Curve, plotting vacancy rates against unemployment rates, also shows a very strong labor market. As the vacancy rate has declined over the past year or so, the unemployment has barely moved. Consequently, the recent combinations of vacancies and unemployment have been moving down towards the post-Great Recession Beveridge curve.

January 31: Employment Cost Index

The employment cost index rose 3.5% in the third quarter of 2023 at a seasonally adjusted annual rate. The ECI growth rate has declined by 2 percentage points since Q1 of 2022.

Our trend measure of core PCE price index is sitting around 2%, meaning that the real ECI has risen about 1.5%.

February 1: Productivity and Costs

Productivity (real output per hour) increased 3.2% in Q4 at a seasonally adjusted annual rate. Output increased 3.7% while hours worked increased 0.4%.

Putting together the ECI and Productivity Numbers

One way to think through these numbers is that when worker costs grow faster than the revenue they bring in, profits (or capital returns) get squeezed. For the final quarter of 2023, nominal employee costs rose 3.5% while real labor productivity grew 3.2%. However, we also need to account for the effects of inflation: the ECI is a nominal variable expressed in current dollars while labor productivity is a real variable expressed in constant’ dollars. Using recent trend core PCE inflation (around 2%) then tells us that per worker revenue rose around 5.3% while employee costs `only’ grew 3.5%. In other words, the recent data implies that capital income (per worker) is actually growing.

Final thoughts

Taken together, the economy is still humming along and inflation has been falling. The decline in hours worked throws a little cold water on the reports, however. Those hoping for cuts in the Fed funds rate may have to wait.

Q4 GDP and PCE inflation

On January 25, the BEA released its Advance Estimate for 2024Q4 GDP. The key headline number: GDP grew at an annualized rate of 3.3% in the fourth quarter, down from 4.9% in the third quarter. The recent number, though down from the fourth quarter, was the largest since the first quarter of 2022. Moreover, surveyed economists from the Wall Street Journal forecast 2% growth.

A useful way to think about this drop in output growth is in terms of the contributions of the major components of GDP. These contributions are the growth of a component multiplied by its share of GDP. The 1.6 percentage point decline in GDP growth is chiefly due to investment (contributing 1.4 percentage points, that is, falling from 1.8 to 0.4) with lesser contributions due to government spending (0.4 points) and consumption (0.2 points). Offsetting contributions were recorded by imports (-0.3 points) and exports (-0.1 points).

The quarterly personal consumption expenditures price index (PCE) fell to 1.7%, continuing an impressive decline starting in Q3 of 2022.

The BEA reports that the PCE price index increased 0.2% in December, up from -0.1% in November. At annual rates, these work out to 2.0% (December) and -0.8% (November). Our measure of trend PCE inflation rose, at an annual rate, from 1.4% in November to 1.6% in December. The earlier CPI report foreshadowed these increases. On a year-over-year basis, PCE inflation was essentially unchanged between November and December at 2.6%.

Our measure of trend core PCE inflation was up slightly, from an annualized 1.9% (November) to 2.0% (December). On a monthly basis, core PCE inflation shot up from 0.8% to 2.1% while the year-over-year rate fell from 3.2% to 2.9%. All in all, core PCE inflation looks to be settling into the Fed’s target of 2.0%. It will simply take a few months for the year-over-year rate to catch up with recent developments.

December CPI

The December CPI (Consumer Price Index) report, released by the BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics) is bad news on the inflation front. By almost any measure, CPI inflation is up. By our recently discussed “constant gain” measure of trend inflation, it rose by 0.4 percentage points for the overall CPI, and by 0.15 percentage points for core CPI (excluding food and energy). On a year-over-year basis, overall CPI rose 0.2 percentage points while core CPI fell by 0.1 points. The figures below show that the one-month annualized inflation rates are also up.

For monetary policy, what presumably matters is not what’s happening with CPI inflation but rather PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditures) price inflation since core PCE inflation is what the Fed looks at. Although it is probably the case that the CPI works to influence the policy makers. The PCE data won’t be released for another two weeks. However, given the broad similarity in the goods covered by the CPI and PCE deflator, it’s a reasonable guess that (core) PCE inflation will also be up. If so, the Fed will be faced with some difficult choices: Do they treat December as (maybe) an aberration and stand pat, or will they view December as the harbinger of another inflationary pulse? Or, cognizant of the long and variable lags associated with the effects of monetary policy, will the Fed leave rates unchanged since they’re already added enough tightening? Having said that, the “trend” line has not risen by much and for the core is basically flat. Therefore, from a long and variable lag perspective it seems doubtful that the Fed will alter their current stance at the meeting at the end of the month.

On measuring trend inflation

One of the challenges over the past couple of years has been measuring trend inflation. As shown in the figure below, monthly inflation rates are volatile; 12-month inflation rates are much smoother, but only slowly reflect changes in trend inflation. Previously, we’ve focused on the 3-month inflation rate.

As shown below, the 3-month inflation rate is approximately the average of three 1-month inflation rates. This means that each month, the 3-month inflation rate adds the current 1-month inflation rate, and drops the 1-month inflation rate from 4 months ago. Consequently, the 3-month inflation rate can drop precipitously if the inflation rate being dropped is relatively high.

A different way of putting the issue is that the calculation for the 3-month inflation rate assigns a weight of 1/3 to each of the past 3 months’ inflation rates, and a weight of 0 to inflation rates 4 or more months ago. Why such a discrete change in weights? Why not a more gradual decline in weights?

The remainder of this post gets into the guts of an alternative measure of trend inflation in which the weights on monthly inflation rates decline with their age. Readers uninterested in the details should feel free to jump to the end which presents our new measure of trend inflation.

The 3-month inflation rate as an average of 1-month inflation rates

Consider the calculation of the gross 3-month (non-annualized) inflation rate for November,

1+\tilde\pi^{(3)}_{November} = \frac{P_{November}}{P_{August}}

where P is the price level (for a given month), and the superscript indicates the horizon over which the inflation rate is computed (3 months in this case). The `tilde’ over \pi indicates that the measure of inflation is not annualized. Similarly, 1-month (non-annualized) inflation rates are given by

1+\tilde\pi^{(1)}_{September} = \frac{P_{September}}{P_{August}}

1+\tilde\pi^{(1)}_{October} = \frac{P_{October}}{P_{September}}

1+\tilde\pi^{(1)}_{November} = \frac{P_{November}}{P_{October}}

From the above, it follows that

1+\tilde\pi^{(3)}_{November} = \left(1+\tilde\pi^{(1)}_{September}\right) \left(1+\tilde\pi^{(1)}_{October}\right) \left(1+\tilde\pi^{(1)}_{November}\right)

The gross 3-month inflation rate is the product of the three immediate past 1-month inflation rates. Taking the natural logarithm,

\ln\left(1+\tilde\pi^{(3)}_{November}\right) = \ln\left(1+\tilde\pi^{(1)}_{September}\right) + \ln\left(1+\tilde\pi^{(1)}_{October}\right) + \ln\left(1+\tilde\pi^{(1)}_{November}\right)

we obtain

\tilde\pi^{(3)}_{November} \simeq \tilde\pi^{(1)}_{September} + \tilde\pi^{(1)}_{October} + \tilde\pi^{(1)}_{November}

where the approximation arises from \ln(1+x) \simeq x for x close to zero.

If we wish to work with annualized inflation rates, then

1+\pi^{(3)}_{November} = \left(\frac{P_{November}}{P_{August}}\right)^{4}

Again taking the natural logarithm, we obtain

 \pi^{(3)}_{November} \simeq 4 \tilde\pi^{(3)}_{November}

The 1-month inflation rates will have “12” in the place of “4”. We now have

\pi^{(3)}_{November} \simeq \frac{1}{3} \left[\pi^{(1)}_{September} + \pi^{(1)}_{October} + \pi^{(1)}_{November}\right]

In other words, the 3-month annualized inflation rate for November is (approximately) the average of the three 1-month annualized inflation rates.

A related problem: computing an average

Given 3 observations on some variable, the sample average or mean is

\overline x^{(3)} = \frac{1}{3} \left[x_{1} + x_{2} + x_{3}\right]

Now, if we add a fourth observation,

\overline x^{(4)} = \frac{1}{4} \left[x_{1} + x_{2} + x_{3} + x_{4}\right]

However, computing \overline x^{(4)} as above discards the “work” done in calculating x^{(3)}. From the calculation of \overline x^{(3)},

x_{1} + x_{2} + x_{3} = 3 \overline x^{(3)}

Substituting into the formula for \overline x^{(4)},

\overline x^{(4)} = \frac{1}{4} \left[ 3 \overline x^{(3)} + x_{4} \right]

or,

\overline x^{(4)} = \frac{3}{4} \overline x^{(3)} + \frac{1}{4} x_{4}

This leads to a well-known formula for recursively computing an average:

\overline x^{(t)} = \frac{t-1}{t} \overline x^{(t-1)} + \frac{1}{t} x_{t}

where t is the number of observations. It says that the mean at date t is a weighted average of the previous mean, and the current (date t) observation.

This is all well and good if the population average is constant. But what if the population average changes periodically. If we knew when these changes in population average occur, we would simply discard all the old observations, and start computing the average afresh. When we don’t know when changes in the population average occur, an alternative approach is to apply a constant “gain” or weight to new observations:

\overline x^{(t)} = w x_{t} + (1-w) \overline x^{(t-1)}

where w is the constant weight.

Application: Trend inflation

The discussion above suggests measuring trend inflation via

\pi^{T}_{t} = w \pi^{(1)}_{t} + (1-w) \pi^{T}_{t-1}

In words: trend inflation is a weighted average of the current one-month inflation rate (with weight w), and the previous trend inflation rate (with weight 1-w). Solving this equation backwards gives

\pi^{T}_{t} = w \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (1-w)^{j} \pi^{(1)}_{t-j}

That is to say, the measure of trend inflation at t is a weighted average of all past inflation rates, and that the weights decline geometrically with time. Put differently, there is a smooth drop off in the importance attached to previous inflation rates. By way of example, for w=1/3, the weight associated with the current inflation rate is 1/3 = 0.333; with the previous month’s inflation rate, 2/9 = 0.222; with the inflation rate 2 months ago, 4/27 = 0.148; and with inflation 12 months ago, roughly 0.00257 — very small.

Our new measure of trend inflation

The figure below plots our `constant-gain’ measure of trend core PCE inflation for a weight of 1/3 on the latest observation, along with the monthly, 3-month, and annual inflation rates. Relative to the 3-month inflation rate, this measure of trend inflation is somewhat smoother while still responding in a timely fashion to apparent changes in trend inflation.

December Employment

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

The BLS announced that payroll employment increased 216,000 between November and December, the private sector contributed 164,000 to the total. Private service producing jobs accounted for 142,000 of the total, despite a 33,300 decline in temp workers and a 22,600 decline in transportation and warehousing jobs. October employment was revised down 45,000 and November down 26,000.

Average weekly hours fell from 34.4 to 34.3 and with the 142,000 increase in private sector employment, total hours of work fell 2.0%.

Average hourly earnings increased 0.4%, from $34.12 to $34.27. Earnings growth has been outpacing price growth over the past few months with the big declines in inflation even though wage growth has slowed somewhat.

A different way to visualize what’s happening to hourly earnings relative to prices is to plot both in logarithms. For current purposes, there are two useful facts regarding logarithms. First, a straight line represents a constant growth rate. In other words, if the Fed hit its target for core PCE inflation, then when core PCE is plotted in logarithms, we would see a straight line. As shown in the chart below, core PCE inflation may have been constant between 2011 and 2015, and again from 2016 to 2020. The second useful property of logarithms is that a constant gap between two lines means that they are growing at the same rate. Of particular interest is comparing the gap between average hourly earnings and a price level since this gap represents real average hourly earnings (that is, after accounting for changes in the price level). In the chart below, the gaps between average hourly earnings and either the CPI or PCE were roughly constant from 2011 to 2013 which means that earnings grew at about the same rate as prices. Perhaps more interesting is these gaps are changing. By way of example, from 2015 to just prior to the pandemic, the gaps between earnings and the price levels increased meaning that real earnings (the quantity of goods and services that can be purchased) increased. During the pandemic-induced recession, real earnings blipped up as nominal earnings rose and prices fell. However, starting in mid-2020, prices grew faster than earnings: the gap between the two shrank. Then, starting in 2022, the gaps between earnings and prices started opening up again. In other words, despite all the concern about inflation, real earnings grew. Indeed, as measured against the CPI, real earnings in late 2023 were close to what they were just prior to the pandemic; against the PCE, real earnings are higher.

The household survey paints a much different picture of the December employment situation. The labor force participation rate fell from 62.8 to 62.5. Employment declined by 683,000 leading to a 0.3 percentage point decline in the employment to population ratio. The number of unemployed rose 6,000 and the unemployment rate rose slightly from 3.72% to 3.74%.

There are well known trends in male and female labor force participation, as well as by race. The chart below digs deeper into the overall labor force participation rate by looking at finer groupings. At the start of the pandemic, labor force participation fell across all groups. Looking since mid-2020, participation by white men has leveled off at a lower level; for white women, it’s hard to tell whether there has been a downward level shift. The participation rate for Hispanic men has trended down since 2007. More recently, their participation rate seems to be leveling off, with no obvious level shift. On the other hand, the participation rates for Hispanic women, Black women and Black men are all back to their pre-COVID levels.

Data for JOLTS (Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey) were released on January 3. JOLTS gives information concerning worker flows in and out of jobs. As shown below, since 2021 the layoff rate has been fairly stable; since 2022, the rates for openings, hires and quits have trended down. Indeed, the hiring and quit rates are close to their pre-pandemic values.

JOLTS data is also useful because it allows us to plot the Beveridge curve, the relationship between vacancies and unemployment. Indeed, the Beveridge curve is central to Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search model of unemployment. In essence the Beveridge Curve is behind the notion of a “tight” labor market: high vacancy rates and low unemployment tend to lead to a growing, or healthy economy. In the figure below, we have color-coded points corresponding to: the Great Recession, pre-Great Recession, post-Great Recession, and since the onset of the COVID pandemic. Visually, the pre-Great Recession and Great Recession periods lie on a relatively stable Beveridge Curve. However, there is a shift in the Beveridge Curve after the Great Recession, and the pandemic period does not fit either of the previous periods. However, over the past couple of years, the unemployment rate has remained fairly stable while the vacancy rate has fallen (see also above). It’s hard to tell where the US labor market will end up, but recent observations are getting close to the post-Great Recession Beveridge curve.

Overall, the reports show a continued strong labor market. The latest reports shouldn’t change Fed calculus.

November PCE Inflation

Bottom line: core PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditure) inflation is down. The monthly annualized inflation rate fell from 1.8% in October to 0.7% in November; the year-over-year rate fell from 3.4% to 3.2%; and our preferred three month annualized rate fell from 2.3% to 2.2%. Ignoring the very noisy monthly rate, these declines are in keeping with our “prediction” of small changes in core PCE inflation based on the earlier CPI (Consumer Price Index) report for November.

Looking at overall PCE price inflation, the three month annualized rate plunged from 3.1% in October to 1.4% in November; the year-over-year rate fall was more modest, from 2.9% to 2.6%. These declines are in line with those of the earlier CPI report.

Given the continued decline in almost all measures of inflation it seems that the Fed will be looking closely at the “real” side of the economy. In fact, the recent revision of GDP by the BEA showed that the third (and final) estimate came in at 4.9%, down from 5.2% in the second estimate. According to the BEA the downward revision primarily reflected a decline in consumer spending, from 3.6% to 3.1%.

In its most recent announcement, the Fed noted,

Recent indicators suggest that growth of economic activity has slowed from its strong pace in the third quarter. Job gains have moderated since earlier in the year but remain strong, and the unemployment rate has remained low. Inflation has eased over the past year but remains elevated.

The latest revision to the third quarter tells us that the third quarter wasn’t quite as strong as previously reported. The Fed puts a lot of resources into nowcasting the US economy, so FOMC’s statement about slowing growth in the fourth quarter is probably a good read on the economy. The downward revision in the third quarter suggests that the fourth quarter may be even weaker than the Fed thought. With core PCE inflation edging closer to the Fed’s 2% target, and a weaker real side to the US economy, further hikes in the Fed funds rate seem unlikely.