by paul gomme and peter rupert
The BEA announced that inflation as measured by the annualized month-over-month change in the Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) price index fell from 3.49% (June) to 2.40% (July) on an annualized basis. Our corresponding measure of trend inflation also fell, from 2.63% to 2.55%. However, the annual (year-over-year) measure rose slightly, from 2.56% to 2.60%.
As is well known, the FOMC concentrates more on core PCE inflation (that is, excluding the “volatile” food and energy components). Core inflation rose across the three measures we regularly report. The annualized month-over-month rate rose from 3.20% to 3.33%; the year-over-year from 2.77% to 2.88%; and our measure of trend from 2.80% to 2.98%.
The PCE inflation results were foreshadowed by the earlier CPI release.
Earlier this week, the BEA also released its second estimate for quarter 2 Gross Domestic Product. In brief, output growth was revised up from 3% to 3.3%.
Policy Outlook
We’ll organize our discussion of the policy outlook around the Taylor rule which prescribes setting the FOMC’s policy rate, the Federal funds rate, based on: (1) the “neutral” Fed funds rate, given by the sum of the real interest rate and the inflation rate; (2) how much the inflation rate exceeds target; and (3) some measure of real activity like the output gap (potential output less actual) or the unemployment rate gap (the actual unemployment rate less its natural rate). (For those wishing to play around with different scenarios, the Atlanta Fed has a web page for that.)
While in theory each of these components is well defined, in practice they are not. Start with inflation. Measuring inflation seems pretty straightforward, particularly since the FOMC has stated its preference for core PCE inflation. At what horizon should inflation be measured? As we’ve harped on in the past, the month-over-month rate is too volatile while the year-over-year rate takes a long time to capture changes in trend. Suppose that the FOMC uses something conceptually similar to our measure of trend inflation. We still face the problem of accounting for transitory phenomena like Trump’s tariffs. Some folks (including some members of the FOMC) argue that these tariffs have pushed up the price level without changing the underlying trend. As a result, measured inflation will be higher, but this does not reflect a change in trend. As always, the devil is in the details: How much of current inflation is due to these transitory factors?
Next, measuring gaps is hard and subject to measurement error. The output gap requires knowing potential output which is the level of aggregate output that the economy could produce with current resources (labor force, capital, etc.) used at typical intensities. Similarly, the unemployment rate gap depends on the natural rate of unemployment: the rate that would prevail in the long run absent shocks. Both potential output and the natural rate of unemployment need to be estimated and so are subject to uncertainty. Further, the current environment is sending mixed signals regarding the real side of the economy. Output growth for the second quarter is humming along quite nicely, but this growth comes on the heels of a disappointing first quarter. The revised job creation data suggest an anemic labor market, but the unemployment rate is still low.
Finally, the neutral Fed funds rate suffers not only from the inflation issues discussed above, but also problems in measuring the real interest rate. The problem for those arguing that the current Fed funds rate is too restrictive — meaning that it’s above its neutral rate — is that we don’t really know that neutral rate.
Those advocating cuts to the Fed funds rate argue some combination of: (1) monetary policy is too tight: the Fed funds rate is well above its neutral level; (2) while inflation is above target, this is due to transitory factors like Trump’s tariffs; and (3) the real side of the economy is weak as evidenced by the job creation numbers.
The case for no change is built on: inflation is too high (and increasing of late) and therefore a restrictive monetary policy is appropriate, and there are mixed signals from the real side of the economy.
The political pressure being applied to the FOMC adds yet another complication. To grasp the nature of this problem, keep in mind that the Fed controls one interest rate: the Federal funds rate which is an overnight rate relevant to banks. The following discussion also makes use of the Fisher equation which states that the nominal interest rate is the sum of the real interest rate and expected inflation. Given that inflation is above target, the risk of cutting the Fed funds rate is that market participants may view the Fed as caving to political pressures to lower interest rates. In turn, market participants may well question the Fed’s credibility and its commitment to low, stable inflation. As a result we would expect a rise in inflation expectations. Then, via the Fisher equation, such an increase in expected inflation will lead to a rise in market interest rates in order to compensate investors for the higher inflation they anticipate. Paradoxically, the political pressures on the Fed make it important for the Fed to keep the current level of the Fed funds rate in order to maintain the Fed’s political independence and credibility. No one wants to be painted as the second coming of Arthur Burns. Here is a fascinating podcast describing how Arthur Burns capitulated to Richard Nixon, bringing about the worst inflationary episodes in recent U.S. history.
